As nations rethink energy security, defence readiness, and industrial competitiveness, critical minerals have moved from technical obscurity to the centre of strategic debate. Yet much of the conversation still stops at reserves and resource ownership. In this article, Ravi Sinha, Consultant Geologist, Advisor to Krishna Mines, JSW and Essel Mining & Industries Ltd, and former Director, Geological Survey of India, argues that the real vulnerability lies elsewhere. Drawing on decades of geological and industry experience, he examines why supply chains—not mineral availability—will determine who builds resilience, who controls technology transitions, and who remains exposed in an increasingly fragmented global order.
For much of the past decade, Rare Earth Elements (REEs) have dominated global conversations on mineral security. From clean energy technologies and electric mobility to defence systems, advanced electronics, and next-generation manufacturing, rare earths have come to symbolise the material foundations of modern economic and strategic power. They have featured prominently in geopolitical disputes, export control regimes, and industrial policy debates across major economies, including India. Their strategic salience has grown not because rare earths are exceptionally scarce in a geological sense, but because access to them has become increasingly politicized, concentrated, and embedded within fragile global supply chains.
Ravi Sinha
The rare earth episode represented the first major global wake-up call on mineral supply chains. When China restricted rare earth exports during its diplomatic dispute with Japan, the consequences reverberated far beyond the immediate bilateral relationship. Prices spiked, downstream manufacturers faced uncertainty, and governments realised that decades of outsourcing environmentally intensive separation and refining had created a structural vulnerability. The episode revealed a critical truth: control over processing and transformation mattered far more than ownership of mineral reserves.
This insight fundamentally reshaped global thinking. Rare earths were not an isolated case of market distortion; they were an early warning signal. They exposed how modern industrial systems depend on materials that are geologically widespread yet economically inaccessible without specialised processing, advanced chemistry, and tightly coordinated logistics. The lesson was clear—material security is shaped less by what exists in the ground and more by who controls the supply chain.
There is no universally accepted definition of critical minerals. Lists vary by country and evolve over time, shaped by consumption trajectories, industrial priorities, technological transitions, and national security requirements. Broadly, minerals are considered critical when they are essential to economic and technological development but face high supply risks due to scarcity, supply concentration, dependence on specialised extraction or processing technologies, or geopolitical exposure. India currently identifies 30–31 critical minerals, the European Union lists 34, and the United
States recognises more than 50. Despite differences in composition, these lists converge on a shared concern: supply chain fragility.
A defining feature of critical minerals globally is that they are confined to a limited number of geographies and processed through highly concentrated supply chains. China dominates upstream, midstream, and downstream segments for a wide range of critical minerals, making it the most influential global actor in this domain. This dominance has reinforced a crucial lesson for policymakers worldwide: mineral vulnerability is not determined by geological presence alone, but by control over supply chains, particularly at the stages of processing, separation, and refining.
As India accelerates its transition toward renewable energy deployment, electric mobility, defence indigenization, optoelectronics, and semiconductor manufacturing, it is becoming increasingly evident that supply chains— not mineral reserves—will determine strategic outcomes. Minerals such as Gallium, Scandium, and Rubidium rarely dominate trade statistics by volume, yet their absence can stall entire industrial ecosystems. These materials are embedded deep within high-value manufacturing systems, and disruptions propagate rapidly downstream, magnifying economic and strategic impact.
THE SUPPLY CHAIN, NOT THE SOIL
Critical minerals differ fundamentally from bulk commodities such as iron ore, coal, or bauxite. Their strategic importance does not arise from sheer volume, but from functional indispensability. A few grams of Gallium can determine the efficiency of a power electronics system; trace amounts of Scandium can transform the structural performance of aluminium alloys; minute quantities of Rubidium can enable high-precision optical and electronic applications. In each case, the economic value of the end product vastly exceeds the material volume involved.
This disproportionate value-to-volume relationship creates unique supply chain dynamics. Production of many critical minerals is governed not by demand for the mineral itself, but by the economics of the host commodity from which it is recovered as a by-product. Gallium production, for example, is tied to alumina refining from bauxite and zinc processing from sphalerite. Scandium availability depends on the processing of laterites and mafic rocks. Rubidium recovery is linked to feldspar and potash systems. As a result, supply is structurally decoupled from downstream demand signals.
From a supply chain perspective, this decoupling is highly destabilising. Even sharp increases in demand for advanced semiconductors, electric vehicles, or defence electronics do not automatically incentivise additional production. The host commodity may already be optimised, or its market may be stagnant. This creates chronic tightness, price volatility, and strategic exposure.
The midstream segment of the supply chain—separation, beneficiation, refining, and purification—emerges as the decisive choke point. Entry barriers are high, capital requirements significant, and technological know-how tightly held. Processing facilities benefit from scale economies and learning curves that discourage new entrants. Once capacity becomes concentrated in a few geographies, downstream industries become structurally dependent.
This explains why supply chain resilience for critical minerals cannot be achieved through mining alone. Exploration success without processing capability merely shifts dependency from raw material imports to refined material imports. True resilience requires integrated control across upstream identification, midstream processing, and downstream material conversion.
WHY AVAILABILITY DOES NOT MEAN ACCESS
A common assumption in today’s critical minerals debate is that if a country has a resource in the ground, it can secure supply. Recent global events have exposed how flawed that assumption is. From rare earth export controls to sudden curbs on gallium and germanium trade, the real vulnerability has not been geology—but access.
Minerals such as Gallium, Scandium, and Rubidium are not rare in nature. They exist across many geographies, including India. What makes them critical is not scarcity, but the difficulty of extracting them in usable form. They occur in trace quantities, embedded within other minerals or industrial materials, and can only be recovered through specialised processing. This is why supply disruptions occur even when resources appear widely distributed.
China’s experience illustrates this clearly. Its dominance did not come from owning all the world’s reserves, but from decades of investment in processing and refining capabilities that others abandoned. When trade restrictions are imposed, it is these midstream capabilities—not mines—that become leverage points.
For India, this distinction matters. Geological presence alone does not guarantee security. Without the ability to separate, purify, and refine critical minerals to industrial standards, countries remain dependent—often on the very supply chains they are trying to de-risk.
THE SEARCH FOR SUPPLY CHAIN OPTIONALITY
As traditional supply chains become more fragile, attention is turning to non-conventional sources such as clay and laterite. Once dismissed as low-value materials, these deposits are now being re-examined globally for their potential to host critical minerals in recoverable concentrations.
Several countries, including Australia, China, and Japan, are investing in technologies to extract critical minerals from such sources. The motivation is not short-term cost advantage, but strategic optionality—the ability to activate alternative supply routes when conventional chains are disrupted.
India is well placed in this regard. Clay and laterite deposits are widely distributed across the country, offering a domestic buffer against external shocks. While extraction from these sources may not yet be commercially competitive, their strategic value lies in resilience. Over time, as technologies mature and processes improve, today’s marginal sources could become tomorrow’s strategic assets.
The lesson is clear: supply chain security will not be built on a single source or geography. It will depend on diversification, redundancy, and the willingness to invest early in options that may seem uneconomic today but become indispensable tomorrow.
WHY THE MIDSTREAM MATTERS MOST
In the architecture of critical mineral supply chains, the midstream segment— processing, separation, refining, and purification—represents the most decisive and least understood choke point. While upstream exploration and mining attract attention due to their visible physical footprint, it is the midstream where strategic leverage is actually exercised. Control over this segment determines which materials can be transformed into usable inputs for industry and which remain geologically stranded.
For high-value, low-volume minerals such as Gallium, Scandium, and Rubidium, midstream processing is not merely a technical step; it is the supply chain itself. These minerals require complex chemical separation, stringent purity control, and specialised metallurgical expertise. Unlike bulk mineral processing, where scale can compensate for inefficiency, critical mineral processing demands precision, consistency, and deep process knowledge. Small deviations in chemistry or temperature can render entire batches unusable for downstream applications such as semiconductors or advanced alloys.
Globally, this has resulted in extreme concentration. Countries that invested early in processing infrastructure—often absorbing environmental and financial costs that others avoided—now command disproportionate influence over supply chains. China’s dominance in critical minerals did not emerge from superior geology, but from sustained investment in refining, separation, and materials science over multiple decades. Once established, these capabilities benefit from cumulative learning effects, making late entry both expensive and risky.
For India, this creates a structural dilemma. Even where upstream resources exist or overseas assets are secured, the absence of domestic midstream capability perpetuates dependence. Exporting raw or semi-processed material only to re-import refined products embeds vulnerability deeper into the value chain. Moreover, midstream facilities are capital-intensive, require long gestation periods, and often struggle to attract private investment due to uncertain pricing and opaque demand signals.
This is why market forces alone cannot resolve midstream gaps. Strategic intervention—through public funding, shared infrastructure, long-term offtake commitments, and risk-sharing mechanisms—is essential. Treating midstream processing as national infrastructure rather than a standalone commercial activity is a prerequisite for supply chain resilience.
THE ANATOMY OF A BREAKDOWN
Critical mineral supply chains do not fail gradually; they fail abruptly and asymmetrically. Unlike conventional commodity chains, where substitution and inventory buffers provide resilience, critical mineral systems are tightly coupled and highly sensitive to disruption. Failure rarely occurs at the mine site. Instead, it manifests at nodes where processing capacity, logistics coordination, regulatory oversight, and contractual governance intersect.
One of the most common failure modes is excessive concentration at a single stage or geography. When separation or refining capacity is clustered in a limited number of facilities, disruptions—whether environmental shutdowns, energy shortages, export controls, or geopolitical tensions—cascade rapidly across downstream industries. For by-product minerals, this risk is amplified because production decisions are subordinate to the economics of host commodities.
Another critical weakness lies in information asymmetry. Downstream manufacturers often lack visibility into upstream processing constraints, while processors operate without long-term demand certainty. This misalignment discourages investment and results in chronic under-capacity. Supply shortages, in such cases, are not caused by lack of resources, but by lack of coordination.
Logistics adds another layer of fragility. Many critical minerals require specialised handling, storage, and transport. Disruptions at ports, shifts in trade regimes, or changes in shipping routes can have disproportionate impact relative to physical volume. Currency volatility and trade policy uncertainty further compound risk for import-dependent economies.
Perhaps the most underappreciated failure mode is institutional fragmentation. Critical mineral supply chains span mining, industry, energy, environment, and trade domains, yet governance is often siloed. Without a unified supply chain lens, policy interventions remain reactive and piecemeal. Designing resilient supply chains therefore requires institutional coordination, long-term planning, and systemic thinking—not just project-level execution.
INDIA’S POLICY RESPONSE
India has begun to acknowledge that critical minerals are no longer a peripheral mining concern but a strategic input into national growth, energy security, and technological sovereignty. This recognition is reflected in recent policy initiatives, including amendments to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act in 2023 and 2025, the introduction of Exploration Licences, and the launch of the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM) with an outlay of ?34,300 crore over seven years.
These reforms mark an important shift in intent. The Exploration Licence framework, in particular, is designed to encourage private participation in early-stage exploration of deep-seated and unconventional deposits, including those hosting critical minerals as by-products or disseminated occurrences. In principle, this opens the door for identifying non-traditional sources such as clay, laterite, and industrial mineral systems that were previously overlooked under auction-centric regimes.
However, a significant gap persists between policy design and ground-level execution. Small and mid-sized players, including local and artisan miners who often operate in clay, laterite, and minor mineral belts, remain constrained by limited access to exploration finance, technology, and institutional support. The National Mineral Exploration Trust, while well-intentioned, remains largely inaccessible to such actors due to eligibility and procedural constraints. As a result, the exploration ecosystem continues to be dominated by a narrow set of participants, limiting diversity of discovery models.
At the international level, India has sought to mitigate supply risk through overseas asset acquisition and partnerships, notably via KABIL. While such efforts are valuable for diversification, they do not address the most critical vulnerability: the absence of domestic processing and refining capability. Without strengthening the midstream at home, overseas sourcing risks recreating dependency in a different geography rather than eliminating it.
A coherent institutional architecture for critical minerals remains an unfinished task. Responsibilities are fragmented across mining, industry, energy, environment, and trade ministries, often resulting in siloed decision-making. A unified supply-chain-driven governance framework—one that integrates geology, processing, manufacturing, and trade—is essential if policy intent is to translate into resilience.
RISING DEMAND, LIMITED OPTIONS
India’s future demand for critical minerals will be shaped less by linear growth trends and more by technological inflection points. Between 2025 and 2047, the country is expected to witness rapid expansion in renewable energy capacity, electric mobility, grid-scale power electronics, defence electronics, and semiconductor usage. Each of these transitions embeds new material dependencies deep within industrial systems.
Gallium demand is likely to rise sharply with the adoption of Gallium Nitride–based power electronics in fast chargers, data centres, telecom infrastructure, and defence applications. Scandium demand will be driven by lightweighting imperatives in electric vehicles, aerospace platforms, and wind turbines, where performance gains cannot be achieved through design optimisation alone. Rubidium, while smaller in absolute volume, will see steady growth through its role in fibre optics, specialty glass, and precision instrumentation.
What complicates this outlook is the non-linear nature of technology adoption. Once cost, performance, or regulatory thresholds are crossed, demand can rise rapidly, overwhelming supply chains that were designed for niche applications. This creates a narrow window for capacity-building, particularly in processing and refining.
Recycling is often cited as a solution to critical mineral dependence, but its role must be viewed realistically. For minerals such as Gallium and Scandium, current recycling rates are negligible due to their use in small quantities dispersed across complex products. While recycling can provide a valuable secondary stream over time, it cannot substitute for secure primary and secondary supply in the foreseeable future.
Financing remains a structural bottleneck. Long gestation periods, high technological risk, uncertain pricing, and opaque markets deter private capital, especially for low-volume minerals. Public risk capital, pilot-scale processing facilities, and state-supported demonstration projects are therefore essential to bridge the gap between laboratory success and commercial viability.
FROM RESOURCE AWARENESS TO SUPPLY CHAIN SOVEREIGNTY
Rare earths may have forced mineral security into the spotlight, but the real reckoning lies ahead. As technologies scale and geopolitics hardens, the question confronting India is not whether it has access to critical minerals today, but whether it is prepared for the moments when access becomes contested. Those moments rarely announce themselves in advance.
What will increasingly matter is the quiet architecture of supply—where processing knowledge resides, how quickly alternatives can be activated, and whether institutions are designed to think beyond the mine and beyond the market. Clay, laterite, and other non-conventional sources matter less for what they yield immediately, and more for the options they create when conventional pathways narrow.
In an era where resilience carries a premium, supply chains are no longer operational backdrops. They are strategic terrain. And it is on this terrain—not beneath the ground—that India’s next phase of industrial and technological confidence will be tested.
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